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Abstract:
Privacy and security concerns are pervasive because of the ease of access to information. Recurrent negative cases
in the popular press attest to the failure of current privacy regulations to keep consumer and protected health information
sufficiently secure in today’s climate of increased IT use. One reason for such failure is that organizations violate these
regulations for multiple reasons. To address this issue, we propose a theoretical model to explain the likelihood that
organizations will select an externally governed privacy or security rule for violation in response to organizational strain
or slack resources. Our proposed theoretical model, the selective organizational information privacy and security
violations model (SOIPSVM), explains how organizational structures and processes, along with characteristics of
regulatory rules, alter perceptions of risk when an organization’s performance does not match its aspiration levels and,
thereby, affects the likelihood of rule violations. Importantly, we contextualize SOIPSVM to organizational privacy and
security violations. SOIPSVM builds on and extends the selective organizational rule violations model (SORVM), which
posits that organizational rule violations are selective. SOIPSVM provides at least four contributions to the privacy and
security literature that can further guide empirical research and practice. First, SOIPSVM introduces the concept of
selectivity in rule violations to privacy and security research. This concept can improve privacy and security research
by showing that organizational violations of privacy and security rules are dynamic and selective yet influenced by
external forces. Second, SOIPSVM extends the boundaries of SORVM, which is limited to explaining the behavior of
organizations under strain, such as economic hardship. We contribute to the theory of selective deviance by proposing
that selectivity extends to organizations with slack resources. Third, we address ideas of non-economic risk and strain
in addition to economic risk and strain. Thus, SOIPSVM explains organizational rule-violating behavior as an attempt to
protect core organizational values from external entities that pressure organizations to change their values to comply
with rules. Fourth, we broaden the theoretical scope of two important constructs (namely, structural secrecy and
procedural emphasis) to improve the model’s explanatory power. Fifth, we identify important elements of rule
enforcement by drawing from the tenets of general deterrence theory. We also discuss how one can study constructs
from general deterrence theory at the organizational level. To conclude, we offer recommendations for the structuring
of organizations and external regulations to decrease organizational rule violations, which often lead to the abuse of
consumer information.
Keywords: Selective Organizational Information Privacy And Security Violations Model (SOIPSVM), Privacy, Security,
Theory Building, Organizational Privacy, Organizational Security, Rule Violations, Policy Violations, Information Abuse,
SOIPSVM, PCI DSS, HIPAA, Selective Organizational Rule Violations Model (SORVM).
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1

Introduction

Information privacy and security are becoming increasingly important in an ever more connected and
information-intensive world. As a result, information privacy and security laws have become prevalent in
many areas of society. This trend began with the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1971; other privacy laws, such
as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, soon followed. With the advent of the Internet and the
associated ease of distributing information, privacy and security laws relating to information systems (IS)
also emerged. Examples include the Federal Information Security Management Act and the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act. Even for-profit industries have
established externally governed rules for privacy and security, such as the Payment Card Industry Digital
Security Standard (PCI DSS).
In this paper, externally governed privacy and security rules refer to laws, directives, policies, and standards
pertaining to privacy and security that are developed by agencies or collectives (governmental or industrial)
external to the organizations subject to the rules. Moreover, the external agencies or collectives enforce the
privacy and security rules through monitoring and/or sanctions and fines.
Despite the existence of these externally governed rules, organizations continue to violate IT privacy and
security rules by misusing protected data purposefully or by failing to protect it adequately (e.g., Anton, He,
& Baumer, 2004; Culnan & Williams, 2009). Organizational violations of externally governed privacy and
security rules can be extremely damaging (Acquisti, Friedman, & Telang, 2006). For example, Citigroup’s
violations of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) resulted in securities fraud and cost investors more than
USD$700 million (Calabresi, 2011). Individuals lodge thousands of complaints annually against
organizations for their misusing protected healthcare information in violation of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (EMS Insider, 2008). Credit card fraud resulting from PCI
DSS violations affects millions of consumers each year (Shaw, 2010).
In response to these issues, a growing body of behavioral security research has looked at ways to help
individual employees better protect the security and privacy of their organizations. Some have looked at
ethical and moral issues that inspire bad employee behavior (Culnan & Williams, 2009; Lowry, Posey,
Roberts, & Bennett, 2014). Some have looked at issues of perceived fairness or loss of freedom that can
cause employees to act out negatively toward security and privacy policies (Lowry & Moody, 2015; Lowry,
Posey, Bennett, & Roberts, 2015). Some have considered rational choice and cost/benefit decisions in
security compliance (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & Benbasat, 2010; Hu, Xu, Dinev, & Ling, 2011a). Low selfcontrol and neutralization are also important individual-level considerations in the literature (Barlow,
Warkentin, Ormond, & Dennis, 2013; Hu et al., 2011a; Siponen & Vance, 2010). Some have adapted
deterrence theory from criminology research to see if one can threaten employees into compliance (D'Arcy
& Herath, 2011). Researchers have also looked at non-invasive ways that one can make employees
experience higher levels of accountability for their organizational security and privacy behaviors (Vance,
Lowry, & Eggett, 2013, 2015). Some have considered using fear appeals to motivate employees to
protective themselves and organizations from security and privacy breaches (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, Moody,
& Polak, 2015; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). Researchers have also carefully considered the key protective
motivation and extra-role behaviors employees should follow for improved security outcomes (Hsu, Shih,
Hung, & Lowry, 2015; Posey, Roberts, Lowry, Bennett, & Courtney, 2013).
The downside of this body of research is that it focuses virtually only on employees themselves and not the
organizational environment and organizational-level decisions. Consequently, the related theories and
empirical evidence are on the individual level, not the organizational level. Despite the importance of
organizational privacy and security, actual organization-level IS privacy and security research is in a nascent
state, which has led to calls for more organization-level research (Belanger & Crossler, 2011; Crossler et
al., 2013; Pavlou, 2011; Smith, Dinev, & Xu, 2011). In particular, we know little about what causes
organizations to choose to engage in serious privacy and security violations of stakeholder rights. In a
separate stream of organizational research, Lehman & Ramanujam (2009) have proposed a theoretical
model, which we refer to as the selective organizational rule violations model (SORVM), that posits that
organizational rule violations are selective. That is, violations do not necessarily result solely from bad
organizational processes or bad rules. Rather, combinations of organizational and rule characteristics lead
organizations to selectively decide to violate certain rules (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Although
researchers have not applied SORVM to studies in an organizational privacy and security context, it
provides an important theoretical foundation that can lead to deeper conceptualization in our context. We
need a new organizational-level theory in the information privacy and security context because previous
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research has focused on organizational privacy and security behavior solely in terms of organizational
characteristics (e.g., Greenaway & Chan, 2005) or rule characteristics (e.g., Hooper & Vos, 2009; Walczuch
& Steeghs, 2001) in isolation. Moreover, SORVM is not contextualized to privacy and security, whereas the
best kinds of theories that are more likely to be tested and to contribute to practice are highly contextualized
(e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Whetten, Felin, & King, 2009; Whetten, 2009), as Boss et al. (2015) recently
demonstrated in a security context.
We call our new, highly contextualized organizational-level model the selective organizational information
privacy and security violations model (SOIPSVM). We designed SOIPSVM to answer the following research
questions:
RQ1: Does the idea of “selective” rule violations apply in explaining organizational-level violations of
privacy and security rules?”
RQ2: A key conceptual limitation of SORVM is that it is limited to explaining the behavior of
organizations under strain, such as economic hardship. Yet, many thriving organizations have
intentionally violated the privacy or security of their stakeholders. Thus, does the concept of
selectivity also extend to organizations with slack resources?
RQ3: Another conceptual limitation of SORVM is that its “strain” concept is based on economic
factors. Yet, in a privacy or security context, organizational strain could occur for many noneconomic reasons, such as regulatory pressure and consumer expectations. Thus, can we
extend this conceptual foundation to account for non-economic sources of strain?
RQ4: Can we apply privacy and security concepts from individual-level research, such as deterrence
theory and its related constructs, at the organizational level to help explain organizational
violations of privacy and security rules?
To explain SOIPSVM and answer these research questions, we proceed as follows. In Section 2, we review
of the existing organization-level research relating to organizational rule, policy, and ethics violations in the
context of information privacy and security. In Section 3, we outline key theoretical foundations and
assumptions and demonstrate how organization-level privacy and security violations fit in the assumptions
and constraints of SORVM. In Section 4, we discuss the need to extend and contextualize SORVM. In
Section 5, building on SORVM, we propose SOIPSVM and carefully contextualize it and extend it to address
our research questions. We include examples relating to HIPAA, PCI DSS, and SOX to demonstrate our
model’s usefulness in the information security and privacy domain. We also discuss the applicability of our
model to a well-known case of organizational rule violations, the TJX Companies, which resulted in security
breaches that SOIPVSM explains well. In Section 6, we explain ways in which future research can
operationalize and test SOIPVSM aside from case studies. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper.

2

Organizational Privacy and Security Violations

Researchers have attempted to explain organizational rule violations from a variety of perspectives.
Research on corruption in organizations has shown that organizational violations are a serious issue
(Acquisti et al., 2006; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008), but little research has investigated
the processes that lead to these violations (Vaughan, 1999; Vaughan, 2002). Some studies have focused
on organizational processes as antecedents to rule violations (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Treviño, 2008;
Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2000), whereas others have noted that the rules’ characteristics themselves are
key drivers of violations (Beck & Kieser, 2003; Lange, 2008; March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000; Zhou, 1993).
Lehman and Ramanujam (2009) bridge these research streams by creating a theoretical model (SORVM)
that incorporates both organizational context and rule characteristics as predictors of rule violations resulting
from perceptions of risk.
Organizational rule violations include all illegal or unethical actions that an organization commits; however, we
deal with only a subset of these violations: privacy and security rule violations. In their literature reviews, Belanger
and Crossler (2011) and Smith et al. (2011) offer an in-depth examination of information privacy and security
literature at all levels of analysis. From the papers these studies review, we selected and reviewed organizationlevel journal papers closely related to our focus: compliance and non-compliance with externally governed rules.
We categorized the papers into those that examined internal rules (e.g., company policies) and those that
examined externally governed rules (e.g., laws). We also categorized the papers by privacy context; most papers
fell into the categories of organization-to-consumer interactions or organization-to-employee interactions. Some
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papers fit into multiple categories. Table 1 categorizes the papers by policy type (i.e., external or internal policies)
and by privacy context (i.e., consumer- or employee-centric).
Table 1. Organization-level Privacy and Security Compliance Studies by Policy Type and Privacy Context

Policy type

Consumer-centric privacy

Employee-centric privacy

Internal
policy/ethical
perspective

Agranoff (1991), Bennasi (1999), Culnan (2000), Culnan
& Bies (2003), Desai, Richards, & Desai (2003),
Greenaway & Chan (2005), Henderson & Snyder (1999),
Jafar & Abdullat (2009), Milne, Culnan, & Greene (2006),
Miyazaki & Fernandez (2000), Miyazaki & Krishnamurthy
(2002), Moores & Dhillon (2003), Peslak (2005, 2006),
Pollach (2007), Ryker, Lafleur, McManis, & Cox (2002),
Smith (1993), Storey, Kane, & Schwaig (2009)

Ariss (2002), Greco (2001),
Schein (1977), Sewell &
Barker (2001), Sipior, Ward,
& Rainone (1998)

External
policy/legal
perspective

Agranoff (1991), Culnan & Bies (2003), Dhillon & Moores
(2001), Greenaway & Chan (2005), Hooper & Vos (2009),
Milne & Culnan (2002), Schwaig, Kane, & Storey (2006),
Walczuch, Singh, & Palmer (1995), Walczuch & Steeghs
(2001)

Ariss (2002), Friedman &
Reed (2007), Greco (2001),
Nord & McCubbins (2006),
Walczuch & Steeghs (2001)

Most privacy and security studies, whether consumer- or employee-centric, focus primarily on internal, not
external, policy compliance. Studies focusing on externally governed privacy and security rules, whether
consumer- or employee-centric, are primarily exploratory and descriptive in nature probably because data
collection is difficult in this research area (Crossler et al., 2013; Dhillon & Moores, 2001; Milne & Culnan,
2002; Nord & McCubbins, 2006; Walczuch & Steeghs, 2001). Much security and privacy research uses
surveys or hypothetical scenarios (e.g., D'Arcy, Hovav, & Galletta, 2009; Siponen & Vance, 2010), both of
which may be difficult to apply to an organization-level analysis of external policies.
Other research (e.g., Hooper & Vos, 2009; Milne & Culnan, 2002; Schwaig et al., 2006) explores the extent
to which businesses obey privacy laws. Dhillon and Moores (2001) use a subjective analysis of survey
panels to identify individuals’ major concerns regarding organizations’ adherence to privacy standards.
Walczuchand and Steeghs (2001) use interviews to explore the possible negative and positive effects of
adhering to data-protection legislation in the European Union.
Culnan and Bies (2003), Walczuch et al. (1995), and Greenaway and Chan (2005) have conducted the few
theoretically grounded studies in this area. Culnan and Bies examine consumer-organization privacy
interaction from the perspective of justice theories. They suggest that organizations can implement fair
information practices in three ways: through government regulation, self-regulation, and technological
solutions. Such information practices should align with consumer perceptions of what constitutes the just
use of consumer information. Walczuch et al. develop a conceptual model to explain the development of
laws relating to international data flows. Their model suggests that culture, in the form of values and
ideologies, affects economic considerations and the public policy-creation process. They also argue that
public policy formulation processes affect the likelihood that regulators will develop data-flow legislation.
Greenaway and Chan (2005) discuss theories that explain information privacy behaviors including, but not
limited to, compliance with laws and standards. They propose two approaches (the institutional approach,
a perspective that examines organizational behavior in the context of social, political, and cultural
environments, and the resource-based view, a perspective that emphasizes economic and competitive
advantage as a driver of organizational behavior) as theories that explain information privacy behavior.
However, they focus only on organizations and not on the characteristics of laws and standards in explaining
privacy violations theoretically. Thus, they fail to capture adequately the relationship between regulators and
organizations.
Despite these papers’ theoretical contributions, they fail to offer a strong theoretical foundation that can
explain organizations’ violations of externally governed information privacy and rules by examining both
organizational context and rule characteristics. Further, these models mostly fail to capture the selective
and dynamic nature of decision processes that affect organizational violations. SOIPSVM represents our
attempt to fill this gap. The lack of a strong theoretical foundation in organizational privacy and security
violations limits our understanding of what causes some organizations to follow rules and others to violate
them. Without understanding why organizations choose to violate or follow rules, it is difficult to devise
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appropriate controls to minimize non-compliance. Thus, we propose a theoretical foundation that can assist
researchers in understanding why organizations violate privacy and security rules.

3

Historical and Foundational Theory

We base our model on the assumptions and propositions expounded in SORVM, which explains why
organizations selectively violate some rules while complying with others. Our adaptation of SORVM better
describes violations of externally governed IT privacy and security rules, particularly those prescribed by
HIPAA, PCI DSS, and SOX.

3.1

An Overview of SORVM: Explaining Selectivity in Rule Violations

SORVM (see Figure 1) posits that organizations violate rules on a selective basis (Lehman & Ramanujam,
2009). SORVM is founded primarily on institutional logics (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), organizational decision
theory (Cyert & March, 1963), and the theory of organizational response to strain (e.g., performance issues)
(Merton, 1938). SORVM accounts for agency by relying on theories of organizational decision making. In
SORVM, an organization’s perceptions of risk and focus of attention—two important factors influencing
organizational decision making—mediate the relationship between contextual conditions and rule
characteristics and the likelihood of a rule violation. In Sections 3.2 to 3.2.4, we explain the model’s key
assumptions and then describe the constructs and relationships in detail.
Contextual Conditions

Structural
secrecy

(-)

Coupling between
violation and
outcomes*

Rule Characteristics

Perception of risk
and
focus of attention

(-)

Likelihood of
a rule violation

Enforceability

(-)

Procedural
emphasis

Rule connectedness

* In the case of positive prior
outcomes and tight coupling, the
focus of attention decreases.

Model key
Solid lines = positive relationships
Dashed lines = negative relationships

Figure 1. Selective Organizational Rule Violations Model (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009)

3.2

Key assumptions of SORVM

Table 2 categorizes SORVM’s assumptions and constraints into those dealing with rules, those dealing with
organizations, and those dealing with violations. The assumptions dealing with rules limit the model’s direct
extension to other forms of social guidance or restraint, such as norms or ungoverned standards. First,
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SORVM views rules as constraints on organizational members and not as moral principles that define social
roles. Second, SORVM focuses on external, formalized rules, such as laws. Third, SORVM is limited to
rules that are low in ambiguity, which means that organizations will have similar interpretations of the rules
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Table 2. Assumptions of SORVM (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009)
Category of
assumptions

Specific assumptions of the model
Rules are constraints on organizational action and not moral principles (p. 645).

Rules

Rules must be external and formal like laws (p. 644).
Rules must be low in ambiguity (p. 644).
Groups with access to critical resources predominantly determine organizational actions
(p. 646).

Organizations

Theoretical scope includes only organizations vulnerable to committing violations, such as
those experiencing organizational strain through performance downfalls or stiff competition
(p. 646).
Rule violations do not include individuals’ violations for personal gain or sabotage (p. 644).

Rule violations

Rule violations result from satisficing solutions devised to address limits to organizational
attention that present themselves during the search for solutions to performance issues
(p. 646).
Rule violations focus on critical organizational resources and the interests of powerful
organizational coalitions (p. 647).

Next, SORVM holds two key assumptions about organizations. First, organizational members form
coalitions that develop goals and perceptions of organizational situations and circumstances that may
conflict with other coalitions (March & Simon, 1958). When conflict occurs between coalitions, the
coalition(s) with access to more critical organizational resources exert greater influence over organizational
actions (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Second, some organizations are more vulnerable to committing violations
than others are. Strain theory (Merton, 1938) suggests that entities may seek to achieve their goals through
deviant or non-routine behaviors when they are unable to do so through legitimate means. Organizations
that experience strain, such as performance downfalls, may be more vulnerable to committing rule violations
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
The remaining three SORVM assumptions limit which type of violations the model can explain. First, SORVM
considers only violations made in conjunction with sanctioned organizational decisions. Because SORVM is
an organization-level theory, individual-level deviance, such as unsanctioned sabotage behavior, lies outside
its scope. Second, when organizations look for solutions to performance issues or ways to use slack resources,
organizational attention is limited (March & Simon, 1958), which, in turn, limits the number of decision
alternatives (Ocasio, 2002). Third, because organizational attention is limited, organizations will focus their
attention mainly on rules affecting critical resources or the interests of powerful organizational coalitions
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), which occurs because organizations seeking to relieve performance downfalls
frame solutions in terms of regaining and maintaining critical resources (Pfeffer, 1992).

3.2.1

Likelihood of Rule Violation

SORVM’s ultimate objective is to predict the likelihood that an organization will violate a rule. The likelihood
of a rule violation refers to the degree to which systemic factors in the organization and regulatory
environment prompt it to violate some rule (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).

3.2.2

Mediating Constructs: Perceptions of Risk and Focus of Attention

In SORVM, the mediating variable perceptions of risk refers to the extent to which an organization will perceive
a rule violation as having negative outcomes that are certain, severe, and uncontrollable (March & Shapira,
1987). Perceptions of risk have a negative relationship with the likelihood that an organization will violate a
rule. Importantly, SORVM only conceptualizes perceptions of risk as economic in nature. The perceived risk
of implementing each alternative filters the solutions to performance downfalls (Shapira, 1997; Slovic, 2000).
When an organization perceives a solution as more risky, the likelihood of a rule violation will decrease, and
the converse holds for solutions perceived as less risky (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
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The other mediating variable, focus of attention, refers to the issues and possible actions on which decision
makers in an organization emphasize. Focus of attention is important because “decision-makers will be
selective in the issues and [solutions] they attend to at any one time and…what decision-makers do depends
on what issues and [solutions] they focus their attention on” (Ocasio, 1997, p. 189). Organizational attention,
overall, is limited (March & Simon, 1958), which, in turn, limits the number of decision alternatives when
organizations look for remedies for performance issues (Ocasio, 2002). Although not all alternative solutions
will lead to rule violations, many decision alternatives can lead to violations (Alexander & Cohen, 1996;
Harris & Bromiley, 2007).
Further, because organizational attention on any issue is limited, organizations will focus their attention
mainly on rules affecting critical resources or the interests of powerful organizational coalitions (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009), which occurs because organizations seeking to relieve performance downfalls frame
solutions in terms of regaining and maintaining critical resources (Pfeffer, 1992).

3.2.3

Contextual Conditions: Structural Secrecy and Violation Coupling

The two major elements of contextual considerations are structural secrecy and coupling between violations
and outcomes.
SORVM proposes that structural secrecy decreases risk perceptions. Structural secrecy refers to “the way
that patterns of information, organizational structures, processes, and transactions, and the structure of
regulatory relations systematically undermine the attempt to know and interpret situations in organizations”
(Vaughan, 1996, p. 238). Structural secrecy influences internal decision making processes, which influence
the likelihood that decision makers will engage in deviant behavior in pursuing organizational goals (Lehman
& Ramanujam, 2009). Decreasing secrecy makes hiding rule violations more difficult and costly (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009). Thus, structural secrecy influences the degree to which external pressures sway
decision makers’ choices. When secrecy is high, isolating rule-related power and knowledge helps to
minimize potential conflicts related to violations (Vaughan, 1996), which decreases perceptions of risk
related to rule violations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Violation coupling refers to “the perceived likelihood that…violations will lead to known outcomes—either
positive, such as a performance improvement, or negative, such as regulatory penalties” (Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009, p. 648). When coupling is tight, the connection between violations and their associated
outcomes is easily discernible, and organizational members perceive the outcome of a violation as
predictable (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). When coupling is tight and organizational members perceive
prior violation outcomes to be positive, organizational members feel a sense of control over the potential
consequences (Shapira, 1997). When violators go unpunished, the consistent benefits of violation lead to a
sense of control over outcomes. Therefore, organizational members are less likely to perceive violations
tightly coupled to positive outcomes as risky and will more likely repeat them (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
For example, an organization that gains financially from violating a rule and that does not receive a penalty
for it will associate the rule violation with positive outcomes and, thereby, decreasing risk perceptions.
Violations tightly coupled to negative outcomes (e.g., fines and sanctions, tarnished corporate image),
however, direct attention to the negative consequences associated with a particular behavior. The perceived
certainty of the negative consequences increases perceptions of risk by decreasing organizational
members’ sense of control over the organizational situations (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).

3.2.4

Rule Characteristics: Enforceability, Procedural Emphasis, and Rule Connectedness

The three major elements of rule characteristics are enforceability, procedural emphasis, and rule
connectedness.
SORVM proposes that the enforceability of a privacy or security rule is a rule characteristic that affects the
likelihood that an organization will violate the rule by increasing perceived risk. Enforceability is the extent
to which organizations view regulatory agencies as able and likely to monitor compliance with a rule and to
seek justice for violations (Fuller, Edelman, & Matusik, 2000). In this way, enforceability is similar to coercive
pressures in neoinstitutionalism.
Procedural emphasis refers to whether a rule’s content emphasizes procedures over outcomes (Lange,
2008). SORVM predicts that procedural emphasis decreases perceptions of risk for several key reasons.
When procedural emphasis is high, the desired outcomes of a rule are ambiguous, which suggests low goal
clarity. When procedural emphasis is low, a rule is unambiguous and desired outcomes are clearly defined
(Edelman, 1992); that is, goal clarity is high. Organizational interpretations of a rule in situations where the
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rule’s goal is unclear can lead to a routinized interpretation of the rule even in unambiguous situations
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). The pursuit of critical organizational resources tend to guide interpretations
of rules (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Power struggles over the interpretations of a rule create emerging
meaning about how organizational members are to perceive the rule (e.g., important or unimportant) and
what efforts, if any, organizational members should take to conform to the rule (Pfeffer, 1992). Powerful
organizational members then legitimize the emerging meaning in support of their particular interpretations
(Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006), and these interpretations become stabilized methods for maintaining
and acquiring critical resources (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). As organizations routinize these
interpretations of rules, organizational members view them as predictable and controllable (March, 1997).
Hence, the routinized interpretations cause perceptions of risk to decrease even in unambiguous situations
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Rule connectedness refers to the amount of interdependence or the number of functional links a rule has
with other rules (March et al., 2000). When connectedness is high, a rule is interdependent on many other
rules—often rules in the same law. However, when connectedness is low, a rule is dependent on few or no
other rules (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Rule connectedness increases perceived risk in three ways.
First, coordination costs increase when rules are interdependent (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). Second,
when multiple regulators exist or the rule system is complex, organizational members may feel less control
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009), which increases the likelihood that members will perceive that regulators
will detect a rule violation and levy sanctions against the organization (March & Shapira, 1987). The increase
in coordination costs and in the likelihood of detection increases perceptions of risk associated with violating
a rule. Finally, when rules are highly connected and, consequently, overlap, a violation of one rule often
leads to or includes violations of connected rules; organizations will perceive violating multiple rules as
having higher risk compared to violating only one rule because the former leads to an increased likelihood
of being caught (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Thus, rule connectedness influences the degree to which
external pressures influence decision makers.

4
4.1

Need for Extending and Contextualizing SORVM
Why We Need SOIPVSM for Organizational Privacy and Security Violations

Although SORVM is useful in predicting organizational violations, we need an extended model in the security
and privacy context for at least three reasons. First, in practice, there are a large number of organizational
privacy and security violations; however, little organizational theory or data (empirical or case) exist to
explain, predict, and address such violations (Belanger & Crossler, 2011; Crossler et al., 2013; Pavlou,
2011; Smith et al., 2011). Individual-level violations have a plethora of theory, and yet some of the most
extreme, damaging cases are on an organizational level.
Second, as noted, the best kinds of theories, which have a strong impact on research and practice, are
highly contextualized theories, not general theories (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Whetten et al., 2009; Whetten,
2009), which Boss et al. (2015) shows. We need SOIPVSM because organizational privacy and security
violations are wreaking havoc on practice in a way that SORVM does not fully address. There are unique
considerations, which other kinds of violations may not reflect, when organizations choose to violate security
or privacy standards. For example, practice has traditionally treated security and privacy issues as “IT”
issues and not management issues; thus, organizational decisions related to these are often treated as a
“black box”, unbeknownst to managers who often do not know how important these issues are until it is too
late. This treatment has resulted in a checklist culture that simplifies information privacy and security to a
list of menial tasks (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). As a result, managers frequently fall prey to unwittingly
making organizational decisions that can increase the likelihood that their organization will violate privacy
rules. SOIPSVM draws management attention to organizational conditions and rule characteristics that may
influence rule-related decisions. By understanding how organizational conditions influence their decisions,
managers can restructure the organizational environment to increase the likelihood that their organization
will make legal and ethical decisions regarding privacy. Further, cultural and society perceptions and laws
about privacy and security violations have changed over time, often in response to major current events
(e.g., Wikileaks, revelations on the NSA’s global privacy violations, the Target data breach). The technology
considerations themselves are increasingly advanced and arcane. Hence, it is more difficult for
organizational members to understand and keep abreast of the underlying technological, management, and
legal considerations than in other more stable areas such as torts, contracts, accounting regulations, and
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best human resource practices. SOIPSVM draws attention to the importance of clarity in rule development
in the privacy and security context.
There is a need in both theory and practice to understand how organizational characteristics and external
forces work together to influence organizations’ privacy and security behaviors. SOIPSVM, as an extension
of SORVM, offers a balance between deterministic approaches that focus on external influencers and
organizational approaches that focus on internal, organizational structures.
Finally, some of the constructs in SORVM narrowly focus on a specific characteristic of a larger concept.
SOIPSVM broadens the theoretical lens of these constructs in SORVM to the larger concept to improve the
explanatory power of the model.

4.2

Using Research on Strain Theory to Extend Limitations of SORVM’s
Assumptions and Propositions

Following strain theory, we suggest that an aspiration level—an expected level of future performance or
achievement—guides organizational actions (Cyert & March, 1963). Early work on aspiration levels
suggests a single reference point for an organization’s expected level of performance (e.g., March &
Shapira, 1987, 1992). SORVM is grounded in this early research. More recent research, however, suggests
that performance relative to aspiration levels may be more complex (Hu, Blettner, & Bettis, 2011b).
Figure 2 depicts the differing risk preferences in relation to organizational performance. SOIPSVM extends
SORVM by adopting the more recent and more complex conceptualization of aspiration levels. SOIPSVM,
therefore, is more extensible in its coverage of organizations because it encompasses organizations with
different levels of performance.

Figure 2. Organizational Risk Preferences Based on Performance Level (from (Hu et al., 2011b)

This concept allows us to extend SORVM in two key ways. First, we can expand the assumption of SORVM
in terms of its application to organizations under strain to include organizations with slack resources.
Second, we discuss a new moderator proposition of SOIPSVM—relative firm performance—that SORVM
does not explicitly depict. We discuss these contributions in Section 5.

4.3

Necessity of Extending the Model to Include Non-economic Risk and Strain

In addition to economic strain (i.e., organizational performance), SOIPSVM considers non-economic forms
of strain that influence the likelihood that an organization will violate rules. Strain theory suggests that
individuals and groups unable to attain their desired goals, whether economic or non-economic, through
legitimate means will be more likely to adopt deviant means to do so (Merton, 1938). Non-economic strain
may result from a conflict between privacy and security rules and core organizational values. When rules
conflict with core organizational values, the resulting strain may lead organizations to violate the rules to
maintain their core values even when perceptions of risk are high. Present-day organizations face multiple
and competing pressures; consequently, they often select which pressures to succumb to (Kostova, Roth,
& Dacin, 2009). Thus, organizations may choose to violate rules rather than their core values. When core
values conflict with rules, an organization’s perceptions of risk may not weigh as heavily in the decision of
whether to violate privacy and security rules because the risk of violating core values will exert greater
influence over organizational decisions.
HIPAA rules provide a clear example of how non-economic strain influences rule-violating behavior. Doctors
and nurses perceive that HIPAA rules negatively influence the quality and efficiency of patient care (Rivard,
Lapointe, & Kappos, 2011), and so they may decide to violate HIPAA rules when they feel the rules conflict
with patient care even if perceptions of risk are high (Lo, Dornbrand, & Dubler, 2005).
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5

Proposing the Extended Theoretical Model, SOIPSVM

SOIPSVM (see Figure 3) explains violations of various organizational IS-related privacy and security
rules. SOIPSVM has the potential to explain differences in compliance between rules falling under the
same law. SOIPSVM can also inform the structuring of organizational and regulatory environments and
the creation of privacy and security rules.
SOIPSVM is founded on SORVM’s underlying theories; thus, we draw from institutional logics, theories of
organizational decision making, and strain theory. In addition, by contextualizing SORVM to the privacy and
security domain, we draw from theories of criminal enforcement (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2011a;
Siponen & Vance, 2010; Straub, 1990) and of organizational structure and information flows (Ghoshal,
Korine, & Szulanski, 1994; Tsai, 2002). Moreover, we draw from research on slack resources to extend the
theoretical boundaries of SORVM.
Contextual Conditions
Formal (a) and
Informal (b)
communication
structures

*Violation coupling
a

P3
b

P3
P

4a

Economic (a) and
Non-economic (b)
strain
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Solid lines = positive relationships; dashed lines = negative relationships

Rule connectedness

* Violation coupling: In the case of positive prior outcomes and tight
coupling (P4b), the perceived risk of violating an information privacy or
security rule decreases.

Figure 3. The Selective Organizational Information Privacy and Security Violations Model

Against this theoretical background, in Section 5.1, we explain the key elements and the basic assumptions
of SOIPSVM that we retained from SORVM and those that we altered. In Sections 5.2 to 5.7, we offer
propositions that contextualize and extend SORVM to the IS organizational rules and violations context. We
also examine the generalizability of SOIPSVM by considering how well each proposition fits with research
on HIPAA, PCI DSS, and SOX in these sections. For readers not familiar with these rules, Appendix A
provides more information on all three.

5.1

Key Assumptions of SOIPVSM

At a general level, SOIPSVM adopts SORVM’s key assumptions. However, we further explain and adapt
these assumptions in SOIPVSM both to contextualize the theory for security and privacy rules and to refine
the original theory. Table 3 lists SOIPSVM’s extended and contextualized assumptions.
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Table 3. Results of Discriminant Validity

Category of
assumptions

Specific assumptions of the model
Rules are constraints on organizational action and not moral principles.

Rules

Rules must be external and formal like laws.
Rules must be low in ambiguity.
Groups with access to critical resources predominantly determine organizational
actions.

Organizations

Theoretical scope includes only organizations vulnerable to committing violations, such
as those experiencing organizational strain through performance downfalls or
organizations with slack resources.
Rule violations do not include individuals’ violations for personal gain or sabotage.

Rule violations result from satisficing solutions devised to address limits to
organizational attention that present themselves during the search for solutions to
performance issues. This assumption helps explain relationships between contextual
Rule violations
conditions/rules characteristics and perceptions of risk.
Rule violations focus on critical organizational resources and the interests of powerful
organizational coalitions. This assumption helps explain relationships between
contextual conditions/rules characteristics and perceptions of risk.
First, the assumptions about the types of rules considered by the model are identical in SORVM and
SOIPSVM.
Furthermore, we retained the first assumption about organizations in SOIPSVM; that is, that the coalition(s)
with access to more critical organizational resources exerts greater influence over organizational actions
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).
However, SOIPSVM extends the second assumption pertaining to organizational strain. As in SORVM,
SOIPSVM assumes that some organizations are more vulnerable to committing violations than others.
SORVM suggests that organizations are more likely to commit rule violations when they perform below
aspiration levels. However, research on aspiration levels and risk perceptions suggests that organizations
with slack resources may also engage in risky behavior (Hu et al., 2011b). Thus, SOIPSVM extends
SORVM’s theoretical boundaries to include organizations with slack resources in addition to organizations
under financial strain. This assumption is pivotal when we describe a moderator proposition in SOIPSVM
between risk perceptions and the likelihood of rule violations in Section 5.3.
SOIPSVM’s remaining assumptions comprise those that constrain which type of violations the model can
explain. First, as with SORVM, SOIPSVM considers only violations committed in conjunction with
sanctioned organizational decisions. Individual-level deviance lies outside its scope. For example, we
consider SOX regulations that hold an organization’s management accountable for actions taken on behalf
of the organization.
Second, SOIPSVM also assumes that, when organizations look for solutions to performance issues or ways
to use slack resources, organizational attention as a whole is limited (March & Simon, 1958), which limits
the number of decision alternatives (Ocasio, 2002). Although not all alternative solutions will lead to rule
violations, studies show that many decision alternatives do lead to violations (Alexander & Cohen, 1996;
Harris & Bromiley, 2007). Although SORVM uses this assumption to propose focus of attention as a
mediating variable, SOIPSVM actually uses this concept in explaining the relationships between contextual
conditions/rule characteristics and perceptions of risk.
Third, SOIPSVM continues to assume that, since organizational attention is limited, they will focus their
attention primarily on rules affecting critical resources or the interests of powerful organizational coalitions
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). Again, this assumption drives and helps explain many of SOIPSVM’s unique
propositions.
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5.2

Likelihood of Rule Violation

SOIPSVM contextualizes the dependent construct to focus only on the likelihood that an organization will
violate security or privacy rules. The likelihood that an organization will violate security or privacy rules refers
to the degree to which systemic factors in an organization and regulatory environment may prompt an
organization to violate an externally governed rule established to protect the privacy and security of
confidential information. We examine the generalizability of SOIPSVM by considering how well each
proposition fits with research on HIPAA, PCI DSS, and SOX.

5.3
5.3.1

Mediating Constructs Applied to SOIPSVM
Perceptions of Risk Applied to SOIPVSM

Like SORVM, SOIPSVM posits that increases in an organization’s perceived risk of violating an externally
governed privacy or security rule will decrease the likelihood that the organization will violate the rule.
SORVM conceptualizes perceptions of risk as economic in nature. However, non-economic and economic
risks influence organizational decisions (Dinev & Hart, 2006). SOIPVSM extends the boundary conditions
of this SORVM proposition by highlighting the influence of both non-economic and economic risk
perceptions on rule violations. Negative outcomes can range from potential financial loss and decreased
employee morale to the tarnishing of an organization’s reputation, threats to core organizational values, and
so on. When decision makers view a rule violation as risky, they will more likely not violate it due to their
fearing negative outcomes from doing so (e.g., uncontrollable consequences deriving from the regulatory
environment) (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Many conceptualizations of risk in the IS literature are economic in nature; that is, they define risk as the potential
for economic or financial loss (e.g., Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky, & Vitale, 2000; Pavlou, 2003; Pavlou & Geffen, 2004).
Similarly, SORVM is grounded in economic forms of risk (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). However, Dinev and
Hart (2006) show that, in addition to possible financial loss, one can conceptualize risk in ways that may be more
relevant to environmental factors. Our concept of perceptions of risk includes but is not limited to economic
conceptualizations. Thus, we define perceptions of risk as decision makers’ fear that violating an externally
governed rule may have uncontrollable and negative consequences for their organization.
In an organizational privacy and security context, an organization introduces non-economic risk when it
places little importance on the value of privacy and security. Organizations adopt privacy and security values
to guide organizational behavior (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006). However, not all organizations adopt strong
privacy and security values. Many organizations simply develop security checklists and ignore deeper
security values (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). Symbolic compliance, such as using checklists, helps to
decrease risk perceptions (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009) but not in a useful manner. Symbolic compliance
refers to documenting or demonstrating actions that an organization takes to appease external entities
regarding rule compliance when actual organizational behavior may be contrary to a rule’s larger purpose.
Symbolic compliance, such as checklists, act as a façade of compliance. Conversely, an organization with
strong privacy and security values will be more likely to view privacy and security rule violations as a risk to
the organization’s core values. Thus, organizations with strong privacy and security values will perceive
greater risk in violating a privacy and security rule than organizations with weak privacy and security values.
Perceptions of risk “vary across organizations, depending on their histories, structures, and cultures”
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009, p. 646). Organizations will select solutions to organizational strain or slack
resources based on perceived risk (Shapira, 1997; Slovic, 2000). Following this logic, decision makers in
charge of compliance with a rule will avoid rule-violating solutions to organizational strain or slack resources
to the extent that they perceive consequences of violating the rule to be negative. Under these new boundary
conditions, this underlying proposition on risk works the same in SOIPSVM as in SORVM. Following the
logic of SORVM, we propose:
P1: An increase in organizational perceptions of risk associated with violating a rule decreases the
likelihood that the organization will violate it.

5.4

Focus of Attention Applied to SOIPVSM

Rather than using focus of attention as a mediating propositional construct as in SORVM, SOIPVISM makes
it an overall driving assumption of the model, which we then use to theorize each of the propositions relating
contextual conditions and rules characteristics with perceptions of risk. When organizations look for
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solutions to performance issues or ways to use slack resources, organizational attention to the issue is
limited (March & Simon, 1958), which, in turn, limits the number of decision alternatives (Ocasio, 2002).
Although not all alternative solutions will lead to rule violations, studies show that many decision alternatives
do lead to violations (Alexander & Cohen, 1996; Harris & Bromiley, 2007). SOIPSVM seeks to explain the
factors that affect the likelihood that decision alternatives will result in rule violations.
Moreover, because organizational attention is limited, organizations will focus their attention mainly on rules
affecting critical resources or the interests of powerful organizational coalitions (Lehman & Ramanujam,
2009), which occurs because organizations seeking to relieve performance downfalls focus on solutions
that involve regaining and maintaining critical resources to survive through the downfall (Pfeffer, 1992).
Hence, their focus of attention is less likely to be on security and privacy risks when they have such a myopic
focus. These assumptions are consistent with SORVM’s focus of attention concept.

5.5

The Role of Economic and Non-economic Strain

SORVM posits that economic strain influences risk perceptions and the likelihood that an organization will
violate a rule. SORVM suggests that, when performance falls below the aspiration level, organizations
become more risk tolerant and are more likely to violate a rule while searching for a solution to organizational
strain resulting from low performance (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). However, extremely poor
performance, such as when an organization is nearing the point at which it cannot survive, leads to rigidity
and risk aversion (Hu et al., 2011b). Similarly, when performance is extremely high, the resulting slack
resources decrease the perception of risk associated with searching for new operating methods (Singh,
1986). For example, high-performing or burgeoning organizations, such as Walmart and Groupon, have
committed SOX violations due to risky organizational decisions (Rogers, 2012). Thus, we expect both
organizations under strain and those with slack resources to engage in risky behavior, which may include
rule violations, as they search for solutions to strain or ways to use slack resources.
An organization’s performance in relation to other organizations in a particular industry offers a common
operationalization of economic strain. An organization’s performance relative to a competitor’s performance
can affect organizational behavior (Harris & Bromiley, 2007; Lant, 1992). Performance is relative to the
industry, and one can define or measure it in multiple ways. Financial organizations, for example, are more
likely to commit financial fraud insofar as they are low performers in comparison to their competitors. Harris
and Bromiley (2007) found that firms that misrepresented their financial statements were more likely to be
low performers in comparison to average performers. This finding suggests that low performers might be
more likely to violate rules such as those prescribed by SOX. In search of ways to expend slack resources,
high-performing organizations may also engage in risky behavior (Singh, 1986).
In addition to economic strain (i.e., organizational performance), SOIPSVM considers non-economic forms
of strain. Strain theory suggests that individuals and groups unable to attain their desired goals, whether
economic or non-economic, through legitimate means will be more likely to adopt deviant means to do so
(Merton, 1938). Examples of non-economic strain include failing to achieve desired status or respect,
perceived injustice, the inability to exercise core values, the loss of positive stimuli, and the introduction of
negative stimuli (Agnew, 1999, 2001). Non-economic strain creates feelings of deprivation, which prompts
individuals and groups to seek solutions to the strain. When legitimate solutions are not available, noneconomic strain results in non-compliant behavior (Agnew, 1999).
In relation to privacy and security rules, non-economic strain may result from a conflict between a rule and
core organizational values. When rules conflict with core organizational values, the strain may lead
organizations to violate the rules in an effort to maintain their core values. Present-day organizations face
multiple and competing pressures; consequently, they often select which pressures to succumb to (Kostova
et al., 2009). Thus, organizations may choose to violate rules rather than their core values. HIPAA rules
provide a clear example of how non-economic strain influences risk perceptions and rule-violating behavior.
Some doctors and nurses perceive that HIPAA rules negatively influence the quality and efficiency of patient
care (Rivard et al., 2011). Patient care is a core value of the work doctors and nurses perform. The lack of
congruence between HIPAA rules and the values of doctors and nurses may lead some medical
professionals to violate HIPAA rules even if perceptions of risk are high (Lo et al., 2005). Summarizing this
section, we propose:
P2a: Economic strain moderates the relationship between an organization’s risk perceptions and its
intention to violate an externally governed privacy or security rule.
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P2b: Non-economic strain moderates the relationship between an organization’s risk perceptions
and its intention to violate an externally governed privacy or security rule.

5.6

Contextual Conditions Applied to SOIPVSM

Again, the two major elements of contextual considerations in SORVM are structural secrecy and coupling
between violations and outcomes. SOIPVSM embraces violation coupling and explains how it relates to
compliance with privacy and security rules. However, SOIPSVM extends SORVM by broadening the scope
of structural influences. That is, SOIPSVM proposes that structural secrecy is just one component of
organizational communication structures. By broadening the theoretical lens to communication structures,
SOIPSVM offers a more holistic and powerful explanation of structural influences on risk perceptions.

5.6.1

Structural Secrecy Applied to SOIPSVM: Organizational Communication Structures

The flow of communication and the organizational structures that facilitate or impede communication flows
in organizations influence organizational risk perceptions (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009; Luhmann, 2005).
SORVM suggests that secrecy in organizational communication caused by formal communication structures
influences risk perceptions. Formal communication structures are bureaucratic structures, such as
hierarchy, centralization, formalization, and specialization, that influence how communication flows through
an organization (Miller & Droge, 1986; Van de Ven, 1976). Although secrecy is one aspect of communication
structures that influences risk perceptions, other important aspects exist. To broaden the scope of SORVM
and offer a more holistic view of the influence of communication structures on risk perceptions, SOIPSVM
explains more broadly how communication structures influence risk perceptions. Additionally, SOIPSVM
draws attention to the importance of informal communication structures, which receive little attention in
SORVM. Informal communication structures are communicative relationships that develop laterally rather
than vertically (Ghoshal et al., 1994; Tsai, 2002). We now discuss how communication structures influence
organizational risk perceptions.
First, as SORVM posits, secrecy in communication structures decreases risk perceptions. High structural
secrecy occurs when the roles and responsibilities for monitoring and complying with a rule are concentrated
into one subunit (Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan, 2004). This concentration of rule-related power results from the
division of labor, hierarchical structure, or job specialization, all of which isolate the knowledge of rule-related
tasks (Vaughan, 1996). Secrecy masks organizational decisions and behavior, which makes noncompliance less detectable while maintaining a façade of compliance (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Second, communication flows influence the creation of organizational norms (Fiol & Lyles, 1985).
Organizational norms can favor compliance or non-compliance with rules (Akers, 2009). Formal and
informal organizational structures, such as security training and social support that favors secure behavior,
can promote positive security norms and behavior in organizations (D'Arcy et al., 2009; Johnston &
Warkentin, 2010). Similarly, adopting common organizational structures can lead to normative tendencies
in an entire industry (Kondra & Hinings, 1998). When decision makers deviate from organizational or
industry norms, they may experience social pressure and other negative consequences (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Kondra & Hinings, 1998). Ultimately, decision makers’ anticipating negative outcomes increases risk
perceptions (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Third, organizational communication influences risk perceptions by acting as a surrogate for actual
experience (Luhmann, 2005). Direct positive and negative experiences with a rule violation influence risk
perceptions (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). In a similar way, positive and negative communication about a
particular experience can influence the risk perceptions of those who have never had direct exposure to the
experience (Luhmann, 2005). Formal structures, such as the division of labor, segregate subunits in
organizations such that that each subunit experiences and interprets organizational events differently. At
times, decision makers may be required to consider rule-violating behavior without directly knowing the
potential outcomes. In such cases, decision makers are likely to rely on the formally and informally
communicated organizational beliefs about the outcomes. In such cases, beliefs that draw attention to
negative outcomes will increase risk perceptions.
Finally, we cannot ignore informal communication structures. Similar to formal communication structures,
informal communication structures affect the transfer of knowledge and the development of norms within
organizations (Tsai, 2002). In fact, informal structures can have more influence on communication and
knowledge transfer than formal structures (Ghoshal et al., 1994). Information security research also
demonstrates the importance of informal structures. For example, scholars have shown informal social
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influence to affect security behavior in organizations (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). More recently, scholars
have shown that indirect communication through subtle interface changes may increase employees’
perceived accountability to protect the security of organizational systems (Vance et al., 2013, 2015). Given
this background, we propose:
P3a: An increase in formal communication structures that favor rule compliance increases
organizational perceptions of risk associated with a rule violation.
P3b: An increase in informal communication structures that favor rule compliance increases
organizational perceptions of risk associated with a rule violation.

5.6.2

Violation Coupling Applied to SOIPVSM

Due to the current regulatory environment, privacy and security violations may rarely be tightly coupled to
negative outcomes. For example, because it is costly and time-consuming to prosecute credit card fraud
successfully, few actual court cases have been pursued (Shaw, 2010). Similarly, the regulatory agencies
that govern HIPAA and SOX compliance have rarely levied fines. Consequently, SOIPVSM adds some key
extensions to violation coupling to better ground in the security/privacy context.
When violation coupling is loose, the outcomes of a violation are ambiguous and not easily predicted, and
the perceptions of risk decrease (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). The ambiguity resulting from loose coupling
drives organizations to interpret outcomes in ways that favor current organizational processes even if these
interpretations are not necessarily correct (Weick, 1995). The ability to interpret outcomes in a favorable
manner decreases risk perceptions. Organizations often fulfill this need by looking to past actions and
relying on previous alternatives for remedying problems (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; March, 1997).
Similarly, to validate prior decisions, organizational members may construe outcomes in a self-justifying
manner (March, 1997). If an organization has previously violated a rule, the ambiguity caused by loose
coupling makes the risk of violating the rule again less discernible (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Loose coupling may be particularly prevalent in our security/privacy context. To illustrate, we use HIPAA
against the backdrop of the industry itself. First, the healthcare industry is complex and highly fragmented
(Bentley, Effros, Palar, & Keeler, 2008). Some observers consider it the most complex industry in the world
because of its massive size; mix of government (e.g., national, state, regional, local), private for-profit, and
private not-for-profit elements; and extreme stakeholder pressures from doctors’ organizations, patients,
lawyers, regulators, pharmaceutical companies, medical manufacturers, and patients. This complexity and
fragmentation makes it difficult for organizational decision makers to relate organizational violations with
their associated outcomes correctly because it is difficult to understand the maze of regulations and who
may be harmed if the regulations are not followed (Field, 2008). HIPAA is just one of hundreds of regulations
that the U.S. medical industry has to worry about, which undermines coupling. In fact, medical regulations
are so complex that medical stakeholders often must report to competing, and often conflicting, authorities
for guidance (Field, 2008). Second, HIPAA regulations allow organizations to outsource their data storage
and other HIPAA-regulated tasks (HHS, 2003). Outsourcing may create loose coupling because violations
committed by the outsourcer may not be recognized by the medical organization and organizational memory
may not be shared between the outsourcer and the medical organization. Third, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) does not monitor HIPAA compliance but asks that victims report abuse (NARA,
2011). If a delay occurs between a HIPAA privacy violation and the time at which a patient reports the abuse
or HHS commences an investigation or if the patient never reports the abuse, loose coupling is possible
because temporal delays between a violation and its associated outcome may increase loose coupling
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). The same may be true for PCI DSS. Because many organizations are left
to audit their own compliance (Morse & Raval, 2008), cardholder complaints may be the only indication of
non-compliance. Therefore, existing privacy and security compliance systems may have little influence over
organizational decision processes due to loose coupling. To address these possibilities in our context,
SOIPVSM extends the underlying violation-coupling proposition from SORVM as follows:
P4a: Privacy and security violations loosely coupled to outcomes decrease organizational
perceptions of risk despite prior outcomes associated with the rule violation.
P4b: Privacy and security violations tightly coupled to positive outcomes decrease organizational
perceptions of risk associated with the rule violation.
P4c: Privacy and security violations tightly coupled to negative outcomes increase organizational
perceptions of risk associated with the rule violation.
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5.7

Rule Characteristics Applied to SOIPVSM

Again, the three major elements of rule characteristics in SORVM are enforceability, procedural emphasis,
and rule connectedness. SOIPVSM improves on this foundation by first conceptualizing enforceability in
terms of the deterrence theory concepts of certainty, severity, and celerity of sanctions. SOIPVSM also
extends SORVM by examining goal clarity instead of procedural emphasis. Goal clarity offers a broader and
richer theoretical lens for understanding how the emphasis of rules influences organizational behavior.

5.7.1

Enforceability Applied to SOIPVSM: Certainty, Severity, and Celerity of Sanctions

To contextualize enforceability, SOIPSVM leverages deterrence theory. SOIPSVM contextualizes
enforceability in terms of the certainty, severity, and celerity of the sanctions that an external regulatory body
enforces on an organization for its violating an organizational privacy or security rule. Thus, the greater the
extent to which an external regulatory body enforces rules with certainty, severity, and celerity, the higher
the risk perceptions associated with organizational rule violations. Deterrence theory originates from
criminology research, but IS security research has applied it to studies of information security policy
compliance (e.g., D'Arcy et al., 2009; Hu et al., 2011a; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Straub, 1990). Deterrence
theory posits that the perceptions of sanctions designed to punish violators deter individuals from deviant
behavior. Research has examined multiple characteristics of the sanctions used to induce deterrence, which
includes their severity, certainty, and celerity. The severity of sanctions refers to “the perceived degree of
punishment for [an] intended act” (Hu et al., 2011a, p. 57). The certainty of sanctions refers to “the perceived
probability of being punished for [an] intended act” (Hu et al., 2011a, p. 57). The celerity of sanctions refers
to “the perceived swiftness of being punished for [an] intended act” (Hu et al., 2011a, p. 57).
Although researchers commonly apply general deterrence theory at the individual level, we argue that
general deterrence theory constructs are ideal for SOIPSVM because they conceptualize organizational
violations as resulting from the decisions of a few powerful individuals. In cases of high secrecy, decisions
to violate rules, although coerced by a leadership collective, may even belong to a single person.
Additionally, the assumptions and driving forces underlying perceptions of enforcement are identical in terms
of general deterrence and SORVM’s concept of enforceability. Both theories suggest that individuals and
small groups react to external pressures in a fearful and compliant way as representatives of the overall
organization. Enforceability, as defined previously, is concerned with whether behavior is monitored (i.e.,
how certain detection and sanction will be) and how damaging the effects will be (i.e., how severe the
sanction will be). Hence, deterrence aptly fits our context.
Enforceability is high when regulatory agencies are able to monitor an organization’s actions frequently,
which is most likely when the regulatory agency and organization are highly interdependent (Edelman,
1992). Scholars have shown monitoring increases to increase perceptions of sanctions’ certainty and
severity of sanctions (D'Arcy et al., 2009). When the likelihood of monitoring is high, enforceability increases
the perceived risk of violating a rule by increasing the chances of detection and reducing organizations’
control over the negative consequences of a rule violation (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). In contrast, when
the likelihood of monitoring decreases, perceptions of risk decrease because organizations are better able
to plausibly deny accusations (Gioia, 1992) and can increase control by creating symbolic compliance
(Edelman, 1992) but not meaningful compliance.
Presently, the HIPAA and PCI DSS regulating bodies do not directly monitor organizational compliance
but instead rely on victims to report violations (NARA, 2011). Any delay in patients’ or consumers’
reporting could decrease the perceptions of celerity. In HIPAA’s case, many reported abuses are resolved
even before HHS can start an investigation. When victims are left to report abuses, laws are more likely
to be abused than when the rules are monitored by third-party agencies (Miller & Sarat, 1981). Historically,
few documented cases of regulatory sanctions for HIPAA violations exist (EMS Insider, 2008). However,
with changes to HIPAA regarding regulatory powers, sanctions are more common. Penalties for SOX
were also lacking historically. Although the regulatory environment is changing, the lack of previous
negative outcomes made HIPAA and SOX penalties appear unlikely and uncertain. However, with
increases in sanctioning, risk perceptions are likely to increase. Similarly, with the advent of the HITECH
Act, stiff penalties are increasingly common, such as the $1 million fine assessed to Massachusetts
General Hospital and the $4.3 million fine assessed to Cignet Health of Prince George’s County,
Maryland. These organizations are unlikely to repeat their offenses due to an increase in the perceived
risk created by the severe fines and settlements.
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Another key issue of sanctions applied in an organizational security/privacy context is that the salience of
deterrence efforts will likely vary according to the coalitions involved. For example, accountants steeped in
SOX knowledge are more likely to feel deterrence effects from SOX regulations than line production
managers who may have little to no knowledge of SOX and the deterrence penalties involved. Deterrence
effects can be particularly interesting in a medical context. In hospitals, for example, nurses, doctors, and
administrators represent three main subcultures, each with partially separate and partially overlapping
values (Rivard et al., 2011). Each group has different views about the organization and about HIPAA
violations. In general, administrators feel the greatest need to comply with HIPAA rules, whereas doctors
and nurses may see HIPAA rules as hindrances to their daily work given that “it has generated a dizzying
set of health-care administrative activities and a new work for legal consultants” (Feld, 2005, p. 1440).
HIPAA has overburdened doctors, especially those in private practice, with paperwork and bureaucracy
and, consequently, has caused doctors to be less willing to enroll their patients in research protocols that
may improve practice and save their patients’ lives (Rash, 2008). Another unintended side effect of HIPAA
that has negatively affected practice is that it has negatively influenced information sharing that is crucial to
improving practice (Davenport, 2013). Not surprisingly, administrators feel a greater self-efficacy to comply
than do medical staff (Johnston & Warkentin, 2008). Nurse and doctor subcultures may be more susceptible
to privacy/security violations because HIPAA rules and deterrence mechanisms are less salient to their dayto-day jobs than administrators are. To summarize this section, we propose:
P5a: An increase in the certainty of sanctions by an external regulatory body for an organizational
privacy or security rule violation increases an organization’s perceptions of risk associated with
the rule violation.
P5b: An increase in the severity of sanctions by an external regulatory body for an organizational
privacy or security rule violation increases an organization’s perceptions of risk associated with
the rule violation.
P5c: An increase in the celerity of sanctions by an external rule body for an organizational privacy
or security rule violation increases an organization’s perceptions of risk associated with the rule
violation.

5.7.2

Procedural Emphasis Applied to SOIPVSM: Adding Goal Clarity

SORVM posits that rules that focus on procedures rather than desired outcomes will decrease perceptions
of risk. This suggestion is based on the premise that procedures allow organizations to signal compliance
to governing bodies even when organizational behaviors may be contrary to the rule’s intended outcomes
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). By framing procedures and outcomes as dichotomous, SORVM assumes
that the outcomes of outcome-oriented rules are always clear. However, rule outcomes are not necessarily
clear to those expected to follow them (Katz, 2006). For this reason, SOIPSVM re-conceptualizes procedural
emphasis as (the lack of) goal clarity. Building on the definition that Tziner, Kopelman, and Livneh (1993)
make, we conceptualize goal clarity as the extent to which a rule designates objectives that minimize the
potential for alternative interpretation and provides information about how to achieve the objectives.
By examining goal clarity, SOIPSVM does not assume that rules’ objectives are equally clear. Goal clarity
also broadens SORVM’s scope by opening the possibility for other influencing factors besides procedural
emphasis. SORVM posits that excessive procedures can obscure the desired outcomes of a rule and leave
room for interpreting the rule in different ways (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). However, other factors may
also influence the clarity of a rule’s objectives. For example, using jargon in writing a rule or failing to employ
a shared vocabulary can create confusion about rule outcomes. Frequently changing procedures and
objectives may also create confusion. By examining goal clarity, SOIPSVM extends the theoretical bounds
and explanatory power of the procedural emphasis concept. When a rule’s goal clarity is high, the rule
clearly defines its expected outcomes. When a rule clearly defines outcomes, ambiguity will be low, which
makes plausible deniability less likely and increases perceived risk. Currently, many of HIPAA’s rules are
flexible and allow for interpretation in that they call for “reasonable” actions (HHS, 2008). Similarly,
interpretations of HIPAA rules are continually evolving (Wipke-Tevis & Pickett, 2008). The lack of clarity
allows for discretion in decision making efforts, which diminishes the potential influence of external
pressures on an organization. PCI DSS also allows organizations to interpret many of its rules openly by
allowing them to develop their own policies and procedures for compliance (Owen & Dixon, 2007). As such,
organizations commonly misunderstand PCI DSS’s purpose (Rees, 2010).
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However, PCI DSS contains some rules that are high in goal clarity and others that are low. For example,
PCI DSS rules about maintaining firewalls and encrypting transmissions are prescriptive and highly
procedural (Morse & Raval, 2008) and, therefore, low in goal clarity (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
Although these rules offer information for implementation, they do not offer clear security-related goals. That
is, they do not help to explain the rule’s expected outcomes.
Other PCI DSS rules are more outcome oriented, such as those related to developing and maintaining
secure systems (Morse & Raval, 2008). However, organizations commonly misunderstand these rules
(Rees, 2010) possibly because many organizations view PCI DSS compliance as a one-time action or as
requiring action only when they are audited. Maintaining secure IS requires continuous monitoring,
particularly during system upgrades and maintenance (Kidd, 2008). To summarize this section, we propose:
P6: An increase in the goal clarity of an organizational privacy or security rule increases an
organization’s perceptions of risk associated with violating the rule.

5.7.3

Rule Connectedness Applied to SOIPVSM

Finally, we assume that rule connectedness works the same in a security/privacy context as it does in a
more general organizational context as with SORVM. Thus, SOIPVSM replicates the SORVM proposition
that rule connectedness increases risk perceptions.
Many information security and privacy rules, such as those prescribed by HIPAA, have a high rule
connectedness, which means that they connect to a large and increasing number of rules. For example, the
ubiquity of healthcare IT (HIT) in the healthcare industry prompted legislators to enhance the HIPAA
protections by developing the HITECH Act. Legislators created the act to encourage the meaningful use
and adoption of HIT (HHS, 2011). The introduction of the HITECH Act may reduce organizations’ intentions
to violate HIPAA rules because HITECH rules are closely connected with existing HIPAA rules. Following
the logic of SORVM, we propose:
P7: An increase in connectedness of organizational privacy or security rules increases an
organization’s perceptions of risk associated with violating a rule.

6

Discussion

Given the problems that many organizations face about complying with IT privacy and security rules, we
propose SOIPSVM, a model developed to explain such organization-level rule violations. In particular, we
use HIPAA, PCI DSS, and SOX as examples of externally governed IT privacy and security rules. The
model should explain organizational compliance with similar privacy and security rules, such as the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) in Canada, the Data Privacy Directive
(DPD) in Europe, and the Data Protection Act of 1998 in the UK.

6.1

Application of SOIPSVM to the TJX Companies Security-Violation Case

To demonstrate SOIPSVM’s potential applicability to organizational security and privacy research, we now
apply the entire SOIPSVM model in the broader context of the well-known TJX Companies security-violation
case, which the media has extensively reported (Cereola & Cereola, 2011; Chickowski, 2008; Xu, Grant,
Nguyen, & Dai, 2008). Xu et al. (2008, p. 575) aptly summarize this case as follows:
TJX Companies Inc. is a leading off-price apparel and home fashions retailer with headquarters
situated in the United States. In late 2006, the company discovered it was victim to a massive
security breach, which compromised millions of customer records. Despite the internal exchanges
within the IT department concerning the upgrade of their wireless security standard protocol, the
company opted for cost savings rather than increased spending. As the company financials took
a hit, the company was faced with pending lawsuits from credit card companies and affected
customers; government scrutiny of IT security standards; loss of consumer confidence; among
other concerns. Though it has not yet concluded the extent of the financial impact of this incident,
analysts estimate the full cost of the breach might amount up to one billion dollars.
Importantly, this case is considered one of the most catastrophic instances of financial losses suffered by a
firm because of intentional violations of security and privacy standards. Specifically, though many reports
have considered the TJX case as an example of security breaches by external hackers, we offer a unique
perspective by focusing on the organization’s rule violations and their antecedents (without which the
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security breach could not have happened). SOIPSVM clearly explains these intentional violations. Given
this background, we first verify that the TJX case meets SOIPSVM’s core assumptions as Table 3 lists. We
then assess the degree to which the case facts support or undermine SOIPSVM’s core propositions.

6.1.1

TJX and SOIPSVM’s Assumptions

We first consider whether the organizational behaviors that led to the TJX security breach constitute external
rules that are low in ambiguity and that members of the organization should have known. TJX was using
the wired equivalent privacy (WEP) security protocol for wireless transmissions, which had serious security
issues known to TJX’s IT department and upper management. Its using the WEP protocol was contrary to
standards required by PCI DSS. All major card issuers and banks at the time were expected to adopt PCI
DSS. Penalties of non-compliance with PCI DSS included fines or the loss of the ability to process credit
cards. Nonetheless, TJX intentionally violated PCI DSS to “buy time” to identify a less expensive
implementation approach (Xu et al., 2008).
Although the PCI policies were in place, TJX initially failed nine of the 12 requirements that were set; though,
without any major penalties, Visa allowed TJX to resume normal operations on the condition that they would
improve its security (Chickowski, 2008). At this same time, Chief Information Officer Paul Butka knew that
sales had picked up throughout the company and focused on a conservative approach to its internal security
investments (p. 580).
Given the clear requirements of PCI DSS and TJX management’s decision to ignore security simply to save
money, we conclude that TJX knowingly committed a violation of a well-known credit card security standard.
Next, we consider SOIPSVM’s organizational assumptions. The first key organizational assumption is that
groups with access to critical resources predominantly determine organizational actions. Top management
(including the CIO) at TJX had the resources (i.e., money and support) needed to achieve full PCI DSS
compliance by upgrading wireless security protocols, but they chose to withhold it to save money. The
savings were potentially substantial, and management was clearly making a calculated cost–benefit
decision that involved a miscalculation of risk. Implementing PCI DSS compliance requires an average time
commitment of three to five years, and the process is highly complex, costly, and time-consuming (Everett,
2009; Rees, 2010).
The second key organizational assumption concerns vulnerable organizations subject to violations due to
organizational strain. Strain is readily apparent in the TJX case because it made decision not to better
protect its customers in the context of general financial strain.
Finally, TJX’s rule violations conform to SOIPSVM’s rule-violation assumptions. The violations were not due
to the sabotage or misconduct of one individual; they were a broad-based management decision made with
the knowledge of potential risks but without an appreciation of their magnitude. Consequently, the rule
violations occurred as the result of satisficing solutions arising from limits to organizational attention that
presented themselves during the search for solutions to performance issues. That is, the company was
under pressure to improve performance, and it saw improving customer security as a cost with no potential
upstream revenue; thus, TJX sacrificed security to improve the bottom line.

6.1.2

TJX and SOIPSVM’s Mediating Variables

Again, the company’s decision not to better protect its customers was a financial decision made in the
context of general financial strain. In fact, we discovered that, two months prior to the emails mentioned in
Xu et al. (2008), TJX issued a press release that indicated the company was under financial strain. In this
document, Bernard (Ben) Cammarata, Chairman, Acting President, and Chief Executive Officer of TJX
Companies, stated:
September sales trends were softer than we had expected. We attribute this largely to what we
believe was consumer malaise in the aftermath of the hurricanes, as well as the negative impact
of unseasonably warm weather in the Northeast, Midwest and Canada on the demand for fall
fashions.
On a broader level, having recently taken on the role of Acting CEO, I intend to lead our great and
fundamentally strong company to the success I know we can achieve. To this end, I have set
profitable top-line growth as our highest priority (Lang, 2005).
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These quotes show that TJX had not reached projected sales (i.e., aspiration level) and decided to make
“profitable top-line growth” its highest priority. Notably, an “acting” CEO who was under personal strain to
clean up TJX and turn it around made these statements. In fact, as part of the press conference, TJX
announced it was exiting its failing e-commerce business due to strategic blunders and failure to understand
the business in general. These facts provide further evidence that the company’s decision to violate PCI
DSS was financially motivated and related to aspiration levels. Importantly, when performance is at or above
the aspiration level, organizations tend to be less risk seeking and are less likely to look for new methods
to increase performance (Levinthal & March, 1993).
In summary, TJX was an organization under strain in a highly competitive industry in which it was not a top
performer and, thus, fell short of its aspiration level. Worse, most of its competition beat TJX to the rush to
e-commerce; TJX adopted e-commerce so slowly that it completely failed and decided to exit this business.
Accordingly, the TJX case provides support for P2, which proposes an increased moderation effect between
risk and the likelihood of violation, which can eventually lead to actual violation.

6.1.3

TJX and SOIPSVM’s Contextual Conditions Propositions

Members of upper management knew they were violating PCI DSS by employing the WEP security protocol.
Moreover, after it became widely known that upper management decided to save money rather than protect
customers’ security, senior IT staffer Lou Julian emailed the CIO and other executives with the following
prescient warning, which did not change management’s decision (Chickowski, 2008).
Saving money and being PCI compliant is important to us, but equally important is protecting
ourselves against intruders. Even though we have some breathing room with PCI, we are still
vulnerable with WEP as our security key. It must be a risk we are willing to take for the sake of
saving money and hoping we do not get compromised (p. 29).
Another senior IT staffer sent the following email, which also did not result in a change (Chickowski, 2008):
The absence of rotating keys in WEP means that we truly are not in compliance with the
requirements of PCI. This becomes an issue if this fact becomes known and potentially
exacerbates any findings should a breach be revealed (p. 29).
The privacy commissioner of Canada, one of the investigators of the case, also concluded that TJX
knowingly committed a violation. The commissioner concluded:
TJX relied on a weak encryption protocol and failed to convert to a stronger encryption standard
within a reasonable period of time…. While TJX took the steps to implement a higher level of
encryption, there is no indication that it segregated its data so that cardholder data could be held
on a secure server while it undertook its conversion to WPA…. If adequate monitoring of security
threats was in place, then TJX should have been aware of an intrusion prior to December 2006
(Xu et al., 2008, p. 584).
Given this background, we assert that TJX suffered from weak communication structures that failed to
support compliant behavior. The lack of communication in favor of compliance decreased management’s
perceptions of risk as SOIPSVM proposes. Communication structures that do not support compliance occur
when the roles and responsibilities for monitoring and complying with a rule are concentrated into a single
subunit (Kim et al., 2004), knowledge of the rules is isolated, (Vaughan, 1996), and the activities of a subunit
are dissociated from those of other subunits (March & Simon, 1958). TJX had a double problem in that IT
was centralized and left solely in charge of PCI DSS compliance. The lack of communication structures to
support compliance communication across organizational subunits decreased risk perceptions. Coupled
with this, IT had no real power, budget, or authority to gain the resources necessary to comply with PCI
DSS. Such decision making power was relegated to centralized management outside of IT. Notably, the
CIO continually sided with management regarding IT concerns and abandoned what should have been a
more open role of championing both sides. One example is the satisficing demonstrated in an email the CIO
sent to his staff on November 23, 2005, in which he encouraged them to downplay the risk of their situation
even though it should have been clear to him that they were not PCI DSS compliant and were at great risk
(Chickowski, 2008).
We can be PCI compliant without the planned FY ’07 upgrade to WPA technology for encryption
because most of our stores do not have WPA capability without some changes…. WPA is clearly
best practice and may ultimately become a requirement for PCI compliance sometime in the
future. I think we have an opportunity to defer some spending from FY ’07’s budget by removing
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the money from the WPA upgrade, but I would want us all to agree that the risks are small or
negligible (p. 29, emphasis added).
When his staff clearly, formally communicated through email warnings that the risks were not small or
negligible, he ignored the warnings and pressed forward in support of management’s desire to defer IT
spending for compliance. He was the one senior member of management who knew better, yet he caved
to management pressure. An additional source of structural secrecy with respect to IT was the lack of an IT
committee on TJX’s board of directors, another aspect of its failure to comply with IT controls standards
(Cereola & Cereola, 2011). Hence, one person was able to downplay and obfuscate risk because no one in
senior management or on the board of directors had the knowledge to vet his claims. The lack of support in
formal communication structures to support PCI DSS compliance (namely, through TJX hierarchy) created
low risk perceptions, which supports P3a. The low risk perceptions and rule violation in the TJX case
supports P1.
Likewise, because the CIO was the only person with an IT background invited to the frequent discussions
of IT budgets, TJX lacked the informal communication (e.g., the open-door ability for an IT staff member to
explain the issues in person to senior management) that can decrease structural secrecy. Only the CIO
discussed the issues with the IT department. When senior IT staff formally warned upper management of
the risks, management deferred to the CIO rather than further communicating with these staff members
(P3b supported).
Considering that the members of TJX’s top management were not IT or security experts and no major security
breaches had occurred up to this point in corporate history, top management easily downplayed the risks
involved in its satisficing decision even though staff had warned management of the risks several times. That
is, there was no organizational memory of past violations because top management was using inferior security
protocols and choosing to roll out improvements slowly in direct violation of PCI DSS. This situation specifically
created the unfortunate scenario of prior positive outcomes (no security breaches) with tight coupling, which
supports P4 (specifically, 4b). This greatly exaggerated lack of perceived risk led to security violations. Top
management believed the oft-repeated mantra that “IT doesn’t matter” and that they should minimize IT
investment. The fact that the company had strategically failed in its e-commerce business and was in the
process of exiting it may have reinforced the attitude that IT is a non-strategic cost center.

6.1.4

TJX and SOIPSVM’s Rule Characteristics Propositions

Visa chose not to penalize TJX and allowed the company to continue to violate PCI DSS with TJX’s partial
implementation of the PCI DSS rules. Moreover, PCI DSS does not involve a governing body that directly
monitors organizational compliance but instead relies on victims to report violations (NARA, 2011).
Accordingly, the discovery of TJX’s violations by credit card companies was uncertain; punishments were
highly unlikely, and they lacked severity and swiftness. Hence, the TJX case also supports P5: the lack of
sanctions served to diminish perceived risk.
In terms of goal clarity, it would appear that the way to achieve PCI DSS compliance is clear because the
rule specifically outlines 12 requirements. However, PCI DSS is complex, and it allows organizations to
interpret many of its rules openly by freeing organizations to develop their own policies and procedures for
compliance (Owen & Dixon, 2007). Therefore, organizations commonly misunderstand PCI DSS’s purpose
(Rees, 2010). Consequently, the case supports P6.
Finally, we consider the degree to which PCI DSS exhibits rule connectedness. We believe that the rule
connectedness of PCI DSS is moderately low. On one hand, it does have a moderate relationship with SOX in
that SOX requires constant monitoring and concerted efforts to design systems compliant with its rules (Mishra
& Weistroffer, 2007). Unfortunately, the courts’ interpretations of SOX have become increasingly divergent
(Lechner, 2012), further obfuscating any connection between SOX and PCI DSS. Moreover, one can argue for
rule connectedness to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) laws by citing the fact that TJX violated the FTC Act by
not providing “reasonable” security for personal information. Thus, the key problem we see with PCI DSS
connectedness to other laws/regulations is its highly technical and industry-specific nature, which led to TJX’s
decreased ability to estimate risk accurately. Thus, we conclude that the relationship between rule
connectedness and perceived risk, as proposed in SORVM and assumed in SOIPSVM, is not well supported
(P7 supported). Table 4 summarizes the propositions supported by the TJX case.
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Contribution of SOIPSVM to Theory and Research

SOIPSVM contributes to theories of organizational deviance in five ways. First, SOIPSVM introduces
the concept of selectivity in rule violations to privacy and security research, a research area in need of
organization-level theories. This concept can improve privacy and security research by showing that
organizational violations of privacy and security rules are dynamic and selective yet influenced by
external forces.
Second, SOIPSVM proposes that selective rule violations may extend beyond organizations under strain,
such as economic hardship. Slack resources may also lead to risky organizational behavior that could result
in rule violations. Thus, SOIPSVM is applicable both to organizations seeking to remedy poor performance
and those seeking ways to use slack resources. Further, SOIPSVM more completely explains the way
organizational performance influences deviant behavior. Drawing on research on organizational aspiration
levels (Hu et al., 2011b), we propose that organizations are likely to disregard external pressures to conform
to regulations only when their performance is extremely high or moderately low in comparison to their
aspiration levels. SORVM considers the effects of performance only when it is below organizational
aspiration levels, which fails to benefit from the nuanced insights of recent research on organizational
aspirations. SOIPSVM includes organizational performance relative to an aspiration level as a moderating
variable. Notably, aspiration levels were a clear factor in the TJX case.
Table 4. Propositions Supported by the TJX case
Proposition
P1. Risk perceptions decrease rule
violations
P2a. Economic organizational strain
moderates an organization’s risk
perceptions and its intention to violate
rules.
P3a. Formal communication structures that
favor compliance increase risk
perceptions.
P4b. Privacy and security violations tightly
coupled to positive outcomes will
decrease organizational perceptions
of risk associated with the rule
violation.

Supported?

Evidence

Yes

TJX email correspondence shows low risk
perceptions among top managers, which resulted in a
violation of PCI DSS

Yes

TJX faced financial strain at the time of the violation.
TJX stated that improving their financial situation was
the highest priority. (There was not enough evidence
to support non-economic strain for P2b, although it
was likely present).

Yes

Formal hierarchy did not support PCI DSS
compliance as a priority. Internal monitoring and
compliance decisions were isolated to the IT
department. (There was not enough evidence
support informal communication structure for P3b).

Yes

TJX had not experienced prior negative outcomes
related to using WEP and received no prior penalties
for lack of PCI DSS compliance. There is not enough
information to support P4a and P4c.

P5. Certainty (a), severity (b), and celerity
(c) of sanctions increase risk
perceptions.

Yes

The lack of monitoring and lack of swift, certain, and
severe penalties from the payment card industry
created low perceptions of risk among TJX
management. They were essentially given carte
blanche to continue the status quo with no penalty.

P6. Goal clarity of a rule increases risk
perceptions.

Yes

In many instances, PCI DSS is open to interpretation.

P7. Rule connectedness increases risk
perceptions.

Yes

There are few rules related directly to PCI DSS. In
communication between management, no other rules
were mentioned.

Third, SOIPSVM includes considerations of non-economic conceptualizations of risk and organizational
strain. SORVM considers mainly economic strain and perceptions of economic risk. Drawing from noneconomic conceptualizations of perceived risk (Dinev & Hart, 2006), SOIPSVM suggests that risk can be
based on threats to values and other important organizational concerns in addition to economic threats.
Similarly, strain theory is not limited to economic strain (Merton, 1938). Strain may arise any time an
individual or collective cannot achieve a goal or satisfy a value through legitimate means. For example, one
can perceive privacy laws in medical settings as a threat to patient care. Where one perceives privacy rules
to affect patient wellbeing negatively, organizations may feel strain and choose rule-violating solutions to
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remedy the strain. By extending SORVM in this way, SOIPSVM broadens the scope of selective
organizational violations to include a wider set of circumstances.
Fourth, SOIPSVM increases the explanatory power of two constructs from SORVM; namely, structural
secrecy and procedural emphasis. SOIPSVM introduces formal and informal communication structures
instead of structural secrecy and a rule’s goal clarity instead of procedural emphasis. The TJX case supports
both of these extensions. Formal and informal communication structures that support compliant behavior
more richly explain risk perceptions than structural secrecy alone in part because structural secrecy is just
one aspect of communication structures. We highlight other important aspects of communication structures
that relate to risk perceptions, such as the norm-setting powers of communication structures and the ability
of organizational communication to act as a surrogate for actual experience. Goal clarity extends procedural
emphasis by highlighting the false assumption that outcome-oriented rules are always clear. Goal clarity
broadens the theoretical lens of procedural emphasis by drawing attention to other aspects of rules beyond
an emphasis on procedures that influence risk perceptions.
Fifth, we identify how one can extend general deterrence constructs to organization-level research.
SOIPSVM posits that organizational behavior results from a few powerful decision makers acting in their
legitimate organizational appointments and working to achieve organizational goals. Because SOIPSVM
deals with the perceptions of a few powerful individuals, one can adapt individual-level constructs such as
perceived certainty, severity, and celerity of sanctions to account for organizational behavior, which is
particularly illuminating for the TJX case because the company knowingly violated PCI DSS but was lightly
reprimanded by Visa even though it could have been fined and subjected to further sanctions. We argue
that such weak sanctions essentially rewarded TJX for its neglect and, thus, undermined the sanctioning
authority of PCI DSS. Had Visa severely fined and punished TJX, the company’s calculations of sanctions
and risk may have changed, which may have prevented the security breach.
We believe SOIPSVM can ultimately help to inform both the creation and reform of privacy and security
rules and the structuring of the regulatory environments that govern these rules. Moreover, SOIPSVM
offers insight into ways organizations can structure themselves to reduce violations and increase
corporate social responsibility.

6.3

Implications for Practice

In view of each of our model’s propositions, we offer several suggestions for structuring organizations and
regulatory environments. In essence, managers, stakeholders, and investors can use SOIPVISM as a
warning guide in assessing a company’s potential for highly damaging rule violations. SOIPVISM not only
is a novel assessment guide but also points to structural reforms that organizations can implement to
increase risk perceptions and decrease violations. It can also serve as a guide for regulating authorities in
their search for ways to increase participation in and compliance with their regulations.
For example, organizations and regulatory bodies should be concerned with inducing and increasing
organizations’ perceptions of risk related to privacy and security rule violations. Organizational communication
structures can strongly influence risk perceptions. Regulators might develop policies to mandate multiunit
teams in organizations, which would include organizational members from different organizational functions,
to govern decisions about privacy and security rules. Multi-unit compliance teams may increase risk
perceptions by decreasing structural secrecy and allowing compliance norms to spread throughout the
organization. Regulators should also focus more on the core values of organizations that will be subject to
privacy and security laws. Organizations with values that conflict with certain rules may be unwilling to follow
them (Lo et al., 2005). Therefore, to develop successful regulations, regulators should incorporate core
organizational values into their rules. Some privacy and security rules, such as those prescribed by HIPAA,
do not adequately consider core values of key organizational coalitions (Rivard et al., 2011).
Managers should also be proactive about developing structures to decrease the likelihood that their
organization will violate rules. Managers can institute multiunit compliance teams by assigning members
from different organizational units to monitor rule compliance and make decisions regarding issues that
pertain to privacy and security rules. Multi-unit teams may ensure compliance with privacy and security
standards when under conditions of strain or excess. Managers can also embed in IS the values that align
with the external rules governing the organization. Managers should also be cognizant of rule-breaking
routines. Past rule-breaking behaviors may continue if organizations do not adjust the rule-breaking status
quo. Managers should conduct internal and external audits of their organizations to ensure compliance with
privacy and security rules. Audits are likely to decrease structural secrecy and increase risk perceptions.

Volume 17

Issue 1

62

Organizational Violations of Externally Governed Privacy and Security Rules: Explaining and Predicting Selective
Violations under Conditions of Strain and Excess

Through consistent sanctions, regulatory agencies can create the perception that penalties for rule violations
are severe, certain, and swift. In terms of regulating bodies, we saw that Visa did not punish TJX for lack of
compliance with PCI DSS even though it could have fined TJX for non-compliance. Instead, Visa coddled
TJX and allowed it to continue with inadequate security measures, which served to undermine the effect of
any potential sanctions, decrease risk, and reward TJX for non-compliant behavior. This case serves as a
warning to regulatory agencies that rules prohibiting violations lose their deterrent effect when agencies fail
to impose sanctions.
Regulating bodies may need to be more diligent in enforcing the privacy and security rules they govern.
Many of the rules we examine in this paper, such as those prescribed by HIPAA and PCI DSS, have not
been heavily monitored, and few penalties and fines have been imposed. For example, another flaw of PCI
DSS uncovered in the TJX case is that the regulatory agency relied on consumers, who occupy a position
of low power and low information, to report violations. Where privacy and security rules are associated with
few and inconsistent penalties, organizations are not likely to perceive risk in violating the rules.
Moreover, for some privacy and security laws, fines and penalties have not been assessed because of the
laws’ complexity and wording. For example, the courts’ interpretations of SOX have become increasingly
divergent (Lechner, 2012), which undermines perceptions of sanctions and risks for SOX non-compliance.
Worse, it makes SOX compliance a guessing game. Similarly, organizations may be subject to penalties
under PCI DSS even when they are highly compliant with the primary recommendations in PCI DSS. These
inconsistencies in the laws and standards create room for confusion and organizational interpretation.
Lawmakers should also consider the reasonableness of the laws for different types of organizations. For
example, complying with externally governed rules may be too costly for small organizations and
consequently lead to rule violations. Lawmakers do not always consider the economic and non-economic
strain exerted by laws. They could adjust such rules based on organizational factors, including size and
ability to comply.
Regulatory bodies that govern similar rule domains should band together to leverage their combined power
to protect privacy and ensure security. Organizations’ perceptions that they could be caught and punished
for violating a rule may increase to the extent that multiple related rules govern organizational behavior
(Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009). For example, organizations may not violate privacy rules and laws
concerning healthcare information if governing bodies besides HIPAA introduced related rules. The
American Medical Association, a prominent medical coalition in the US, could adopt privacy standards tied
to medical licensure. This redundancy in regulation and the increased penalties for rule violations would
likely increase the perceived risk of abusing healthcare information.

6.4

Limitations and Future Research

SOIPSVM’s primary limitation is that it no one has yet empirically tested it. To help researchers test
SOIPSVM, we briefly discuss ways that they could operationalize and test its constructs. Multiple measures
exist for the severity, certainty, and celerity of sanctions; centralization; and informal communication. Other
constructs (e.g., structural secrecy and violation coupling) do not have explicit measures in the literature,
which makes operationalization more challenging. Thus, using discretion is pivotal in selecting the most
appropriate and representative measures to maximize construct validity. Appendix B suggests alternative
measures for all constructs in SOIPSVM.
Another limitation of SOIPSVM is its lack of explanatory power with regard to organizations performing at
or above their aspiration levels. Again, part of SOIPSVM’s foundation is Merton’s strain theory (1938), which
SOIPSVM leverages to suggest that organizations that cannot achieve socially desirable goals through
legitimate means might seek to do so through deviant behavior. Thus, this theoretical foundation limits the
explanatory power of our model to apply to those organizations more likely to commit deviant behavior; that
is, those that have not attained their aspiration level. SOIPSVM is also restricted to explaining externally
formalized rules. SOIPSVM does not account for violations of informal rules, such as social norms and
industry best practices related to privacy and security. Information sharing in supply chain relationships
offers an interesting area for studying informal rules because formalized rules do not protect many forms of
information exchanged in supply chain relationships. SOIPSVM also cannot explain violations of internally
developed employee regulations. The nuances in the differences between externally and internally
developed rules and regulations would likely pose a problem in testing the selectivity of rule violations at an
organizational level (Lehman & Ramanujam, 2009).
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SORVM suggests that organizational attention is an important mediating construct in explaining violations,
but the evidence for and discussion of the focus of attention concept is scant in Lehman and Ramanujam’s
(2009) seminal work. For this reason, SOIPSVM does not apply focus of attention as a construct but instead
uses the concept as an axiom to describe certain aspects of the model. Future research could revisit and
further develop the role of organizational attention in SOIPVSM.
Although we focus on some externally governed rules in the healthcare, consumer, and financial industries
in this paper, researchers can likely extend SOIPSVM to other related domains. SOIPSVM’s core
assumptions are the primary constraints that researchers should consider in developing such an extension.
Nonetheless, further theoretical development could neutralize many of the limiting assumptions. For
example, researchers could likely apply many of SOIPSVM’s concepts to an individual context by
substituting individual-level psychological theories for organizational theories.
It would also be useful to study organizations from different cultures and with different HIPAA-like
regulations. A study of SOIPSVM focused on a hospital’s organizational culture could also be useful
because researchers have shown the interplay between doctors, nurses, and administrators to be important
in daily hospital life (Rivard et al., 2011).
Finally, it could be beneficial to study SOIPSVM in the context of multiple privacy laws. For example, one
could examine HIPAA, PIPEDA, and DPD together to determine whether the rule characteristics or
contextual conditions of the laws affect the frequency or severity of violations. Importantly, future studies
could also investigate HIPAA violations in relation to mobile technology because many current uses of
mobile technology by doctors and nurses represent breaches of HIPAA rules.

7

Conclusion

The explosive growth of HIT in the healthcare industry, credit card transactions in the retail industry, and
finance scandals in the financial services industry demonstrates the need for organizations to improve
compliance with privacy and security rules. Unless regulatory environments and organizational structures
change for the better, rules violations are likely to worsen. SOIPSVM offers a way to explain organizational
violations of IT privacy and security rules, such as those prescribed by HIPAA, PCI DSS, and SOX. Our
model shows how organization and rule characteristics affect organizations’ risk perceptions, which, in turn,
result in organizations’ deciding to violate rules while under strain. The model and recommendations
presented in this paper could help to improve regulatory environments and organizational structures by
identifying the deficiencies and vulnerabilities in organizational systems.
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Appendix A: Supplemental Information on HIPAA, PCI DSS, and SOX
HIPAA
In the United States, HIPAA and the associated Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act, governed by the Department of Health and Human Services, have assumed the role
of guarding protected health information (PHI). In other parts of the world, single laws protect PHI and other
types of private consumer information. For example, Canada’s Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act establishes guidelines for protecting the electronic distribution of all types of
private data, including PHI. The same is true for the Data Protection Directive in the European Union.
In recent years, healthcare IT (HIT) has become essential in the healthcare industry (Rivard et al., 2011)
and is now widely used (Feldman & Horan, 2011). Forecasts also predict a boom in the HIT market over
the next several years (RNCOS, 2011a; RNCOS, 2011b; RNCOS, 2011c). Organizations using HIT can
jeopardize the privacy of patients’ PHI in many ways. HIPAA violations include actions as simple as
improperly positioning computer monitors and more complex violations such as failing to encrypt patient
data sent to doctors’ mobile phones or failing to implement compliance policies and structures. Given the
ubiquitous use of HIT, the U.S. Government passed an extension of HIPAA called the HITECH Act into law.
The HITECH Act offers further direction about how to safely use HIT to improve the healthcare industry
(HHS, 2011).

PCI DSS
PCI DSS is an industry standard established by a coalition of large credit card providers, such as Visa, to
encourage organizations to proactively protect consumer credit card information from computer crackers.
Private-sector organizations, not government agencies, govern PCI DSS (Morse & Raval, 2008). As such,
PCI DSS offers few legal remedies. Instead, the private-sector organizations enforce PCI DSS by raising
transaction charges, fining violators, revoking the right to process credit card transactions, and by requiring
organizations to undergo audits and/or to hire qualified security assessors (Owen & Dixon, 2007; Rees,
2010). PCI DSS auditing requirements differ according to the number of transactions that an organization
processes (Morse & Raval, 2008; Owen & Dixon, 2007). Major PCI DSS requirements include building a
secure network with well-configured firewalls, encrypting credit card data, establishing strong virus controls,
maintaining logs, conducting penetration testing, and devising appropriate security policies (Owen & Dixon,
2007).

SOX
SOX is U.S. federal legislation passed to increase accountability for accounting-related fraud and errors
(Leon, Abraham, & Kalbers, 2010). SOX requires organizations to adopt internal controls and guidelines for
financial reporting. For example, organizations must provide quarterly and annual reports to the Securities
and Exchange Commission (Smith, 2003). Accounting practices are embedded in organizations’ IT;
therefore, designing accounting systems appropriately is required for SOX compliance (Smith, 2003; Mishra
& Weistroffer, 2007). Mishra and Weistroffer (2007), for example, provide a framework for developing SOXcompliant software. SOX allows for criminal prosecutions of organizations and individuals involved in
financial fraud. Nonetheless, no major penalties have been levied against an organization based on this
legislation. The potential penalties for SOX noncompliance may include fines of up to USD$5 million or
imprisonment for up to 20 years (CULS, 2012).
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Appendix B: Potential Testing of SOIPSVM and Operationalizations of
Its Constructs
A primary limitation of SOIPSVM is no study has empirically tested it yet—importantly, neither has anyone
empirically tested SORVM. To facilitate researchers’ in future testing SOIPSVM, we briefly address ways
one might operationalize and test its constructs. In this appendix, we do not propose the optimal
measurement of the constructs (one can measure most constructs in multiple ways); rather, we propose a
first step in generating ideas for future research to test our model. Thus, using discretion is pivotal in
selecting the most appropriate and representative measures to maximize construct validity. One could
measure the relationships in SOIPSVM using a variety of research designs (e.g., field survey, secondary
data). Here, we suggest some approaches for testing the model:

Survey of Multiple Organizations
First, one could test the model by developing a survey instrument to distribute to a sample of organizations.
One could create measures for the survey through a development process similar to that proposed by
MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Podsakoff (2011) and Lewis, Templeton, and Byrd (2005), or one could adapt
measures from existing research. Table B1 presents a list of measures that are potentially adaptable to the
SOIPSVM context. As with the research design, one could use many existing scales for certain constructs.
Researchers, therefore, should be thoughtful in selecting appropriate measures. For example, one might
select existing measures for their psychometric properties or relation to the domain of interest. One could
analyze survey results using PLS or SEM procedures. Although IS researchers use survey research
frequently and successfully, it has limitations. For example, the results of the survey approach described
above do not establish causal links between constructs. Instead, they offer support for the existence of the
relationships. Establishing the temporal precedence of events is not possible in the survey method
described above. Survey research also lacks the richness of insight that one can obtain through qualitative
research.

Use of Experimental Scenarios
Second, preliminary studies could test the hypotheses through a scenario-based approach in which
executives, preferably multiple executives from each organization, receive hypothetical vignettes to test the
underlying theory. This approach is similar in design to a factorial experiment (and is, thus, termed the
factorial survey method); different respondents receive different “treatments” in the scenarios. For example,
some surveys would contain scenarios where centralization of power is high in the hypothetical organization.
Other versions of the scenario would include a description of an organization where centralization of power
is low. One applies this manipulation of the constructs to a subset of the constructs of the model. One would
then ask participants to indicate what their perceptions of risk associated with a potential rule violation (using
validated perceived risk survey measures—see Table B1) would be and what their perceptions of the
likelihood that the organization would commit the violation would be if they were in power in the given
organization. This approach has advantages for dealing with organizational rule violations that participants
do not want to disclose their individual involvement in and knowledge of and has been effectively used in
individual IS compliance research (e.g., Hu et al., 2011a; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Vance et al., 2015).
Because the scenarios act as experimental groups, one can establish further evidence of causal links
between constructs. However, this design also has disadvantages, including respondents’ being unfamiliar
with the situation and those who respond to the survey without real concern for the results. Some have also
criticized scenario-based research because it may facilitate emotional detachment between the respondent
and the scenario and, therefore, fail to capture participants’ likely responses in real-world situations.

Field Studies
A third possibility for testing our model is to move toward more challenging field studies of actual
organizations required to follow HIPAA or other IS security and privacy rules. More complex testing could
also potentially use large samples of randomly selected organizations and randomly selected individuals in
these organizations.
These field studies could involve organizational leaders responding to surveys; several survey measures
exist for some of the constructs (see Table B1). However, some of these measures were developed for
scenario-based studies, and one would need to adapt them to account for actual events. Other constructs
(e.g., structural secrecy, violation coupling, and rule connectedness) are not closely associated with existing
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survey measures, which makes operationalization more challenging. One would need to develop and
validate new survey measures.
Another alternative for organizational field studies is to supplement survey measures with direct observation
by and/or interaction involving researchers in the organizational setting. In this case, researchers would
measure organizational characteristics in different ways depending on the construct. Researchers could
examine hierarchies of the organization to determine centralization, monitor employee interaction to
determine informal communication, and interview top organizational personnel to determine structural
secrecy and violation coupling. To measure rule characteristics, the researchers would obtain a list of rules
to which the organization is subject (e.g., HIPAA, PCI DSS, etc.) and then determine characteristics of the
rules as perceived by the organization or as shown by its actions.

Secondary Data Analysis and Mixed Methods
One could also test the SOIPSVM model by using secondary data as operationalizations of the constructs.
For example, the research team could collect news articles over a given time period that record violations
of specific security and privacy rules. Researchers could determine, for example, the severity and celerity
of punishments for rule violation for a given rule by aggregating news reports about such violations from
several organizations. The researchers would then gather more information from the media or from violating
organizations about relevant constructs that the news reports do not disclose. To supplement these data, it
should be possible to use other secondary data (e.g., 10K reports) to clarify the structure of the organizations
and other key constructs.
Finally, a mixed-methods approach is a useful alternative to keep in mind. Whereas one may best measure
some constructs by survey, for example, one may best measure others by secondary data retrieval. A
mixed-methods approach could compensate for the disadvantages of the individual research designs.
Table B1. Possible Survey Measures of SOIPSVM Constructs
Construct

Survey items
Our business transactions with other units should be approved by
upper management.

Formal communication
Any agreement or dispute over inter-unit activities should be reported
structures:
to upper management, and we should let management settle the issue.
centralization (option A)
Upper management has the ultimate power to decide whether we
collaborate with other units in the organization.

Notes
Borrowed from Tsai
(2002).
Rated 1 to 7 (strongly
disagree to strongly
agree).

Extent to which decision making responsibility concerning capital
budgeting is centralized at the highest levels of management.

These are directly
Extent to which decision making responsibility concerning new product replicated from (Lin,
Formal communication introduction is centralized at the highest levels of management.
2006, p. 431). They
structures:
used a Likert-type
centralization (option B) Extent to which decision making responsibility regarding entry into
scale from 1 = strongly
major new markets is centralized at the highest levels of management. disagree to 5 = strongly
agree.
Extent to which decision making responsibility regarding pricing of
major product lines is centralized at the highest levels of management.
Formal…informal
Scheduled in advance…unscheduled
Arranged participants…random participants
Informal
communication
structures

Participants in role...participants out of role
Preset agenda...unarranged agenda
One-way...interactive
Impoverished content...rich content
Formal language...informal language
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Table B1. Possible Survey Measures of SOIPSVM Constructs

Networking
opportunities
(possible insights
into informal
communication
structures)

On average, how many days per year do you spend in
interdepartmental committees, teams, and task forces?
On average, how many days per year do you spend in
interdepartmental meetings and conferences?
On average, how many days per year do you spend in meetings with
upper management?
The positive external consequences of violating [specific rule or
standard] are clear to key decision makers in this organization.
The positive internal consequences of violating [specific rule or
standard] are clear to key decision makers in this organization.
The negative external consequences of violating HIPAA are clear to
key decision makers in this organization.

Violation coupling

The negative internal consequences of violating [specific rule or
standard] are clear to key decision makers in this organization.

If managers in my organization intentionally violated [specific rule or
standard], specific, predictable outcomes (negative and/or positive)
would occur.

It is routine for Health and Human Services to audit our organization to
identify HIPAA computer violations. [HIPAA as example].
Certainty of
sanctions

Organizations that violate [insert a particular IT rule here] will be
caught.
It is likely that a violation of [insert a particular IT rule here] can be
traced back to the violating organization.
Organizations caught violating [insert a particular IT rule here] will be
severely punished.

Severity of sanctions

Borrowed from
Ghoshal et al. (1994).

Organizations caught violating [insert a particular IT rule here] will be
reprimanded.
Organizations caught violating [insert a particular IT rule here] will face
serious consequences.

This concept is new to
the literature and not
directly based on a
previous research
stream; thus, it needs
the most work.
We propose these
items based on the
construct definition that
Lehman & Ramanujam
(2009) provide.
We also believe it
would be most effective
to ground the concept
in the particular
violation context
studied (e.g., HIPAA
violations).
Borrowed from Hu et
al. (2011a). Rated 1 to
7 (strongly disagree to
strongly agree).

Borrowed from Hu et
al. (2011a). Rated 1 to
7 (strongly disagree to
strongly agree).

For our organization, actions against violating [insert a particular IT rule
here] are immediate.

Borrowed from Hu et
For our organization, actions against violating [insert a particular IT rule al. (2011a). Rated 1 to
Celerity of sanctions
here] are instantaneous.
7 (strongly disagree to
strongly agree).
For our organization, actions against violating [insert a particular IT rule
here] are timely.
It is clear what outcomes are expected in the rule that states [insert a
particular IT rule here].
The information provided on the [organization that administers a given
privacy or security standard] website about [insert a particular IT rule
Borrowed from Tziner
Goal clarity (in place here] will help you protect patients’ medical information.
et al. (1993). Rated 1
of procedural
The information provided on the [organization that administers a given to 7 (strongly disagree
emphasis)
to strongly agree).
privacy or security standard] website about [insert a particular IT rule
here] was sufficiently unambiguous.
The information provided to you by [organization that administers a
given privacy or security standard] about [insert a particular IT rule
here] was sufficiently detailed.
Rule connectedness

[Specific IT rule] is highly connected to other rules with which our
organization must comply.
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Table B1. Possible Survey Measures of SOIPSVM Constructs
Complying with [specific IT rule] requires our organization to comply
with other information security rules.
By complying with [specific IT rule], our organization is automatically
complying with many other rules.

A violation of [specific IT rule] would be problematic because it would
entail a violation of other rules at the same time.

empirically tested rule
connectedness, we
propose these items as
potential survey items
to measure
perceptions of rule
connectedness
(Lehman &
Ramanujam, 2009;
Sullivan, 2010). One
measures these items
on a Likert-like scale
ranging from disagree
to agree.

What do you believe is the risk for your organization due to the
possibility that: my organization could be issued severe sanctions for
violations of [insert a particular IT rule here].
Perceived risk of
violations

What do you believe is the risk for your organization due to the
possibility that: the media could damage my organization’s image by
sharing information about violations of [insert a particular IT rule here]
committed by my organization.

Borrowed from Dinev &
Hart (2006).
Rated 1 to 7 (very low
risk to very high risk).

What do you believe is the risk for your organization due to the
possibility that: my organization will be caught if it violates [insert a
particular IT rule here].
Determine the industry of an organization using the four-digit standard
industry classification (SIC) code. Examine organizations’ sales data
Economic strain:
using data from Compustat or an equivalent database for organizations Borrowed from Harris &
performance relative
with the SIC code of the focal organization. Compare the focal
Bromiley (2007).
to industry average
organizations’ sales to the average sales of organizations with the
same SIC code.
[Insert a particular IT rule here] conflicts with the core values of my
organization.
Noneconomic strain:
If my organization follows [insert a particular IT rule here], we will have
conflict between
to sacrifice some of the core values of my organization.
rules and core
values
By following [insert a particular IT rule here], my organization will not
be able to follow its core values.

Likelihood of
violation

Newly developed.
Rated 1 to 7 (strongly
disagree to strongly
agree).

If you were an employee at this organization, what is the likelihood that Borrowed from D'Arcy
you would have violated [insert a particular IT rule here] [on behalf of
et al. (2009).
your organization]?
Rated 1 to 7 (very
I could see myself violating [insert a particular IT rule violation here] [on unlikely to very likely).
behalf of the organization] if I were in this situation.
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